January 2021 - Idpy-discuss

Agenda: idpy Developers call, 16 May 2019

by hlflanagan＠sphericalcowgroup.com

Date: Tuesday, 16 May 2018 Time: 06:00 PT | 09:00 ET | 15:00 GMT https://bluejeans.com/163562895 Agenda: 0. Agenda bash 1. Governance update a. Commons Conservancy b. Note Well and licensing by repository vs license in each file 2. Code releases - speed vs stability? a. Resources (do we have enough if we use them well? If not, what are we asking the idpy Board for?) 3. GitHub review a. pySAML2 - https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2 b. Satosa - https://github.com/IdentityPython/SATOSA c. pyFF - https://github.com/IdentityPython/pyFF d. ... 4. AOB Thanks! Heather

4 months

7
9
0 0

Project licensing within IdentityPython

by ivan.kanak＠gmail.com

Hi all, being part of Commons Conservancy brought up yet another subject, which is whether we should add a header with license information in every file in the projects under idpy. This is not something done in an abstract way, there is a specific format modelling this information (see https://spdx.org/ and https://reuse.software/ - more specifically https://reuse.software/practices/2.0/) Still, I find it problematic. We want to open up the question to the wider community and consider their thoughts on this. The forwarded message below is discussing this subject. You can see the question we posed, the answer we got and my comments. Feel free to tell us what you think on this. ---------- Forwarded message --------- Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 at 09:56 > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > Date: May 8, 2019, 8:15 AM -0700 > > > Why does CC think having a single license file per project is > > insufficient? Our thought is that if we can avoid adding a header to > > every single file, that would be nice, esp. given we already have this > > info in the license file and we have the Note Well. > > > this is not just our opinion, but something that is an industry and > community standard for legal compliance these days. When companies like > Siemens, Samsung or Honeywell use some code in one of the hundreds or > thousands of devices and systems in their product line, they need to be > able to provide the correct license and a download of the exact version. > This means machine readability too. > I've actually observed the opposite of that. Communities abandon the "license in every file" model, and just use a single LICENSE file in the root of the project. The LICENSE file contains license information, that is, it is not a single license but it has exception sections and so on. > To quote from https://reuse.software/practices/2.0/ : > > Scroll to the section "2. Include a copyright notice and license in each > file"... > > "Source code files are often reused across multiple projects, taken from > their origin and repurposed, or otherwise end up in repositories where > they are separate from its origin. You should therefore ensure that all > files in your project have a comment header that convey that file’s > copyright and license information: Who are the copyright holders and > under which license(s) do they release the file? > Continuing from above, the standardization of package-management formats and tools has helped exactly with that: to avoid distribution of single files, and instead provide packages and modules. It is bad practice and considered a hack to copy files. Nobody liked that model and everyone is moving away; it is unstructured, it becomes unmanageable and it will cause problems. > It is highly recommended that you keep the format of these headers > consistent across your files. It is important, however, that you do not > remove any information from headers in files of which you are not the > sole author. > > You must convey the license information of your source code file in a > standardised way, so that computers can interpret it. You can do this > with an SPDX-License-Identifier tag followed by an SPDX expression > defined by the SPDX specifications." > > (the text goes on for a while after this, to clarify the point but this > is the basic gist of it) > > There is a nice Python tool to check: > > https://github.com/fsfe/reuse-tool > > I hope this makes sense > Well, it does not make complete sense. We're talking about licensing a project. A project is not just code; there are data files (html, xml, yaml, json files), binary files (archives/zip, images, audio, video, etc), text files (configs, ini-files, etc) all "not-code". How do you mark those files? Does the LICENSE file need a license-header? The json format does not define comments, how do you add a header there? If a binary file does not get a license header, why should a file with code get one? I would expect there to be a way to have the needed information unified. If the files themselves cannot provide this information it has to be external; thus the LICENSE file. If someone is worried about somebody else re-using single files that do not have license information (a python file, a png image, etc) there is really nothing you can do (the DRM industry has been trying to solve for a long time; and still your best bet is "social DRM"). Since, we're developing on open source with a permissive license, even if someone does that, should we be happy that someone is actually using what we built or sad that the files they copied did not have a license header? And if they include the license information of that copied file in their project's LICENSE file, is this solved? Having pointed these contradictions, I am thinking that the "license in every file" model seems to be a step backwards. It is introducing overhead and does not really solve the problem, while at the same time it enables a culture of bad practice (copying files around). Cheers, -- Ivan c00kiemon5ter Kanakarakis >:3

6 months

5
4
0 0

PySaml2 v5.0.0 - Security release

by ivan.kanak＠gmail.com

Hello everyone, there has been a report on incident-response at idpy.org about a security issue in PySaml2. Alexey Sintsov and Yuri Goltsev from HERE Technologies reached out and reported a XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) vulnerability. The issue affects responses with signed assertions. PySaml2 can be tricked to think that an assertion had been signed and use the assertion information, when in reality the Signature points to another part of the xml document that is controlled by another party. The issue was assigned CVE-2020-5390 and is now fixed in the latest pysaml2 release. The relevant code commit that fixes is the issue: https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2/commit/5e9d5acbcd8ae45c4e736ac521… Release v5.0.0 contains more changes, including: - Add freshness period feature for MetaDataMDX - Fix ipv6 validation to accommodate for addresses with brackets - Fix xmlsec temporary files deletions - Add method to get supported algorithms from metadata - Add mdstore method to extract assurance certifications - Add mdstore method to extract contact_person data - Start dropping python2 support Pointers to the release with changelog and more information, below: - the relevant release commit: https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2/commit/f27c7e7a7010f83380566a219f… - the github release: https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2/releases/tag/v5.0.0 - the pypi package: https://pypi.org/project/pysaml2/5.0.0/ + + + + + + + + In more detail, regarding the XSW vulnerability: libxml2 follows the xmldsig-core specification. The xmldsig specification is way too general. saml-core reuses the xmldsig specification, but constrains it to use of specific facilities. The implementation of the SAML specification is responsible to enforce those constraints. libxml2/xmlsec1 are not aware of those constraints and thus process the document based on the full/general xmldsig rules. What is happening is the following: - xmldsig-core allows the signature-information and the data that was signed to be in different places. This works by setting the URI attribute of the Reference element. The URI attribute contains an optional identifier of the object being signed. (see "4.4.3 The Reference Element" -- https://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core1/#sec-Reference) This identifier is actually a pointer that can be defined in many different ways; from XPath expressions that need to be executed(!), to a full URL that should be fetched(!) in order to recalculate the signature. - saml-core section "5.4 XML Signature Profile" defines constrains on the xmldsig-core facilities. It explicitly dictates that enveloped signatures are the only signatures allowed. This mean that: * Assertion/RequestType/ResponseType elements must have an ID attribute * signatures must have a single Reference element * the Reference element must have a URI attribute * the URI attribute contains an anchor * the anchor points to the enclosing element's ID attribute xmlsec1 does the right thing - it follows the reference URI pointer and validates the assertion. But, the pointer points to an assertion in another part of the document; not the assertion in which the signature is embedded/enveloped. SAML processing thinks that the signature is fine (that's what xmlsec1 said), and gets the assertion data from the assertion that contains the signature - but that assertion was never validated. The issue is that pysaml2 does not enforce the constrains on the signature validation facilities of xmldsig-core, that the saml-core spec defines. The solution is simple; all we need is to make sure that assertions with signatures (1) contain one reference element that (2) has a URI attribute (3) that is an anchor that (4) points to the assertion in which the signature is embedded. If those conditions are met then we're good, otherwise we should fail the verification. -- Ivan c00kiemon5ter Kanakarakis >:3

6 months

2
1
0 0

pyFF: Pipes for additional output formats

by rainer＠hoerbe.at

Hi Leif, I added 2 pipes to buildin.py: - publish_html creates static HTML views of IDPs and SPs, using XSLT based on Peter Schober’s alternative to MET; - publish_split: similar to store, but added validUntil and creates signed XML-file per EntityDescriptor. This can be consumed dynamically by ADFS in an IDP role. I put it directly into buildin.py because it shares some code with the sign pipe. Is this viable from your PoV - if yes, I would make an PR. Cheers, Rainer

10 months, 2 weeks

3
2
0 0

Notes: idpy dev call, 26 January 2021

by hlflanagan＠sphericalcowgroup.com

Attendees: Stephen Schwichtenberg, Ivan, Christos, John P, Heather, Johan, Scott Regrets: Roland Notes: 0 - Agenda bash 1 - Security Vulnerability - review looking for feedback on how we handled the announcements. Ivan made a private incident-response team to review the patches, but not sure that many people tested. eduTeams did some testing after about a week and found a few issues coming from the new patches. The new code had test cases, but they can't account for everything. We need better community testing. We made the CVEs public on Jan 20, created a new release for pySAML2, and sent out an announcement. Also updated Satosa, including a new docker image. We also have a new web page: https://idpy.org/security/. Feedback • We announced the new release would be available before we actually had the release. That put some time strain on things that rushed the testing and development. We underestimated the complexity, so suggest we needed to have the testing done first, before we make an announcement. There were also requests for early access; how do we answer questions like that? Who gets early access, and who doesn't? Giving a heads' up to the ops people is good, but better to have the patches ready first. • The clients who had been keeping themselves up to date had the least issues in handling the update. The ones that are still on old versions had quite a few more challenges (custom microservices no longer worked, configs had to change, etc). Standard devops best practice makes responding to this kind of issue much easier. • In terms of curating a list of early testers, the people who show up and contribute to the community are the ones that should get premium access. 2 - GitHub review a. OIDC - https://github.com/IdentityPython (JWTConnect-Python-OidcRP, JWTConnect-Python-CryptoJWT, etc)

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Reminder: idpy dev call, 26 January 2021

by hlflanagan＠sphericalcowgroup.com

Tuesday, 26 January 2021, 14:00 UTC BlueJeans: ⁨https://bluejeans.com/444837426?src=join_info⁩ Regrets: Roland Agenda: 0 - Agenda bash 1 - Security Vulnerability - review 2 - GitHub review a. OIDC - https://github.com/IdentityPython (JWTConnect-Python-OidcRP, JWTConnect-Python-CryptoJWT, etc) b. Satosa - https://github.com/IdentityPython/SATOSA c. pySAML2 - https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2 d. pyFF - https://github.com/IdentityPython/pyFF 3 - Normalizing idpy projects (see email from Ivan, "Subject: [idpy-discuss] Normalizing across all projects”, 10 November 2020) a. Extending the invitation to djangosaml2 - status? 4 - AOB Thanks! Heather

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Vulnerabilities affecting pySAML2 and forthcoming release

by ivan.kanak＠gmail.com

Dear users of IdentityPython, this is a heads-up about two vulnerabilities affecting pySAML2. Software that uses pySAML2 is indirectly affected, too (ie, SATOSA). The issues were reported to the IdentityPython incident-response mailing list and we have been working on a mitigation. A new version of pySAML2 that includes the fixes will be released on Wednesday 20th of January between 13:00 CET and 17:00 CET. We urge everyone to be prepared to update their setup to the latest version. Kind regards, Ivan Kanakarakis on behalf of the incident-response team

5 years, 1 month

1
2
0 0

Notes: idpy dev call, 12 January 2020

by hlflanagan＠sphericalcowgroup.com

Attendees John, Scott, Giuseppe, Ivan, Hannah, Ori, Johan, Chris 0 - Agenda bash 1 - Administrivia Suggestion made that announcements of security issues should include some indication of severity and whether there is indication these have been found 'in the wild'. Also some additional guidance on what to expect with regards to remediation (what are deployers expected to do, what level of effort can people expect to encounter) would be helpful. The team will put together an FAQ on how security vulnerabilities are handled and include a log of known vulnerabilities (once those vulnerabilities and their remediations are public). 2 - GitHub review a. OIDC - https://github.com/IdentityPython (JWTConnect-Python-OidcRP, JWTConnect-Python-CryptoJWT, etc) No update b. Satosa - https://github.com/IdentityPython/SATOSA c. pySAML2 - https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2 Nothing major through the holiday, only some minor fixes for the tests. Ivan wants to reorganize the code a bit to clearly separate the operations that work on the XML document representation from those that work on an object representation of the XML data. d. pyFF - https://github.com/IdentityPython/pyFF No update 3 - Normalizing idpy projects (see email from Ivan, "Subject: [idpy-discuss] Normalizing across all projects”, 10 November 2020) a. Extending the invitation to djangosaml2 - status? Will add to the agenda for our next call 4 - AOB Thanks! Heather

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Reminder: idpy dev call, 12 January 2021

by hlflanagan＠sphericalcowgroup.com

Tuesday, 12 January 2021, 14:00 UTC BlueJeans: ⁨https://bluejeans.com/444837426?src=join_info⁩ Agenda: 0 - Agenda bash 1 - Administrivia 2 - GitHub review a. OIDC - https://github.com/IdentityPython (JWTConnect-Python-OidcRP, JWTConnect-Python-CryptoJWT, etc) b. Satosa - https://github.com/IdentityPython/SATOSA c. pySAML2 - https://github.com/IdentityPython/pysaml2 d. pyFF - https://github.com/IdentityPython/pyFF 3 - Normalizing idpy projects (see email from Ivan, "Subject: [idpy-discuss] Normalizing across all projects”, 10 November 2020) a. Extending the invitation to djangosaml2 - status? 4 - AOB Thanks! Heather

5 years, 1 month

2
2
0 0

Calendar invitation: idpy developers call (2021)

by hlflanagan＠sphericalcowgroup.com

Hello all, Thank you for filling out the doodle poll to determine when we should have our calls! We’ll be using the same time slot (14:00 UTC for now, subject to change during those pesky Daylight Saving Time changes). If the Google Gods are being cooperative today, you should be able to add this calendar invitation via the following link: https://calendar.google.com/event?action=TEMPLATE&tmeid=NXJmNXZ0dG9kbWNkcTd… Our first call for 2021 will be next week on Tuesday, 12 January 2021. Thanks! Heather

5 years, 1 month

1
1
0 0

2026

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

Idpy-discuss January 2021